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Abstract: Most research hasmainly focused on the decline
of the subjective experience in Alzheimer’s disease (AD).
However, few attempts have been made to evaluate
whether subjective experience may be maintained in AD.
In this narrative review, we attempt to provide a positive
view, according to which patients with AD can enjoy, to
some extent, subjective experience during memory
retrieval. Memory and expression difficulties (e.g.,
aphasia) limit the ability of patients with AD to describe
their memories, resulting in a little specificity of reported
memories. However, according to the “authentic sub-
jective experience” view, we propose in this study that the
ability to mentally relive these memories could be
preserved in the patients. By proposing the authentic
subjective experience view, we attempt to provide an
alternative view to the general consideration that the
patients suffer a diminished subjective experience. This
view can contribute to a larger clinical framework that
gives a positive meaning to the subjective experience of
patients with AD. Furthermore, several clinical and
empirical implications can be drawn from the authentic
subjective experience view, including the possibility to
evaluate behavioral correlates of the subjective experi-
ence in AD.
Keywords: Alzheimer’s disease, autobiographical memory,
consciousness, subjective experience
1 Introduction
Memory decline is widely considered as the cognitive
hallmark of typical Alzheimer's disease (AD) [1]. Psycho-
logical research has been mainly concerned with the
diminished ability of the patients to retrieve and relive
past experiences [2]. In this study, we argue that patients
with AD may still be able to enjoy an authentic subjective
experience of memory, that is, they can experience an
authentic sense of reliving during memory retrieval. At
the clinical level, this view is worth considering because
by defending the view that patients with AD possess an
“authentic subjective experience” of the past, we attempt
to offer a positive view of their potential to introspect into
their memory functioning and cognitive performance in
general.
This review begins by providing definitions of basic
terms (e.g., subjective experience and lack of insight).
We then emphasize empirical support to the authentic
subjective experience view that we defend in this study.
Finally, we discuss the implications of the view, as well
as venues for future empirical research. Note that, while
this review is narrative, we also performed a literature
search for papers dealing with the subjective experience
of autobiographical memory in AD. In this literature
search, we used MEDLINE (via PubMed) and Google
Scholar databases using a combination of the following
search terms and key words: Alzheimer’s disease,
anosognosia, autobiographical memory, autonoetic con-
sciousness, consciousness, denial, and insight. The
search resulted in 464 papers, and we screened these

* Corresponding author: Mohamad El Haj, Univ Nantes, Laboratoire
de psychologie des Pays de la Loire, LPPL, EA 4638, F-44000
Nantes, FranceUnité de Gériatrie, Centre Hospitalier de Tourcoing,
Tourcoing, France; Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France,
e-mail: mohamad.elhaj@univ-nantes.fr
Ahmed A. Moustafa: School of Social Sciences and Psychology &
Marcs Institute for Brain and Behaviour, Western Sydney University,
Sydney, Australia; Department of Human Anatomy and Physiology,
the Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Johannesburg,
Johannesburg, South Africa
Jean Roche: CHU de Lille, Unité de Psychogériatrie, Pôle de
gérontologie, 59037 Lille, France
Florence Pasquier: University Lille Nord de France UDSL and
Memory Clinic, CHU, Lille, France
Dimitrios Kapogiannis: Laboratory of Neurosciences, National
Institute on Aging, Baltimore, MD, USA
Karim Gallouj: Unité de Gériatrie, Centre Hospitalier de Tourcoing,
Tourcoing, France
Pascal Antoine: Univ. Lille, CNRS, CHU Lille, UMR 9193–SCALab–
Sciences Cognitives et Sciences Affectives, F-59000 Lille, France
Translational Neuroscience 2020; 11: 201–207
Open Access. © 2020 Mohamad El Haj et al., published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
Public License.
papers to identify those dealing with the subjective
experience of autobiographical memory in patients with
AD, resulting in the below-discussed papers.
1.1 Basic definitions
The subjective experience of episodic memory can be
defined with reference to “subjective experience” as
proposed by Tulving [3] who associates episodic recall
with a feeling of re-experiencing (i.e., autonoetic
consciousness), which refers to the ability to mentally
project one's existence into a subjective time. Impair-
ment in mental time travel can be associated with
memory distortions in AD. According to the Temporal
Consciousness Model [4], patients with confabulations
(including those with AD) have a disturbed sense of
chronology, such that they are able to retrieve the
content of events but not their order of occurrence.
Consequently, they misattribute the features of events
that occurred at one time to other events that occurred at
another time. Regardless of memory, the subjective
experience in patients with AD is a complex and non-
unitary phenomenon [5–8]. The same thing can be said
for the concept of consciousness of general. Although
consciousness can be defined as the awareness of the
self and the environment [9], it also includes several
phenomenological components (e.g., the subjective
experience) and cognitive aspects (e.g., perception,
affect, and control).
The literature proposes several terms (e.g., “denial,”
“lack of insight,” and “anosognosia”) to describe the
decline of the subjective experience in AD. The terms
“denial” and “lack of insight” are typically used to
describe a lack of introspective ability and metacognitive
functioning, whereas the term “anosognosia” is typically
used to describe a failure to acknowledge a particular
cognitive deficit [10,11]. Theoretical accounts on the
mechanism of anosognosia in AD have associated a lack
of insight with a disconnection of the “conscious
awareness system.” The conscious awareness system is
a cognitive system that detects the changes in cognitive
functioning based on the inputs from various brain
regions [12,13]. Any disconnection between the con-
scious awareness system and the changes in a given
cognitive domain (e.g., memory) results in a lack of
awareness within that cognitive domain. A similar
suggestion was made by the Cognitive Awareness
Model [14,15]. This model is composed of components
receiving information from autobiographical memory
and comparator components monitoring performances.
All these components provide an output that feeds into
awareness about the actual performances. According to
the Cognitive Awareness Model, patients with unaware-
ness of memory deficits have difficulties to encode those
failures into memory, relying on outdated representa-
tions of their memory functioning. Research on anosog-
nosia emphasizes the ability of patients with AD to
estimate their own memory functioning and introspect
into their own subjective experience during recall. While
this research explains how the patients estimate and
experience their own memory functioning, it runs the risk
of denying the patients any level of awareness of their
memories (e.g., “lack of awareness” and “anosognosia”).
However, the concept of awareness in AD, at least the
subjective experience of memory, is not necessarily
negative since patients may be able to enjoy an authentic
subjective experience of the past. We here discuss the
research demonstrating how patients with AD can enjoy
an authentic subjective experience of memory.
2 The authentic subjective
experience view
In a previous study, we investigated whether patients
with AD may report a high subjective experience of
autobiographical memories [16]. We asked patients with
mild AD and the control participants to retrieve three
autobiographical memories. For each memory, the
participants were invited to rate its subjective character-
istics on items assessing travel in time, remembering,
reliving, realness, visual imagery, auditory imagery,
emotion, and importance. Besides this subjective eva-
luation, we analyzed the specificity of the retrieved
memories (i.e., whether memories described general
events or specific events situated in time and space). AD
participants showed lower general autobiographical
recall than the controls, and poorer reliving, travel in
time, remembering, realness, visual imagery, auditory
imagery, language, rehearsal, and spatial detail – a
decrease that was especially pronounced for visual
imagery. Yet, AD participants showed high rating for
emotion and importance. Critically, a discrepancy (i.e.,
higher levels of subjective reliving than objective recall)
was observed in patients with AD but not in the control
participants. In other words, despite a compromise in
their (objective) autobiographical performance, patients
with AD attributed a high value to their subjective
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experience, especially to emotion and importance of
memory. This discrepancy could be due to an over-
estimation and alternatively to a high consciousness
experience during which patients with mild AD possess
authentic subjective experiences of the past. This
interpretation is further supported by a study demon-
strating that despite a compromise in some subjective
features of recall (e.g., in the ability to create a visual
image of the retrieved event), other subjective features
(i.e., emotion and importance of the recall) can be fairly
experienced by patients with mild AD [17].
We propose the authentic subjective experience view
to explain the discrepancy between subjective reliving
and objective recall in patients with AD. This is different
from the anosognosia account. While the anosognosia
account also deals with the subjective experience of
remembering, this account attributes the failure to
introspect into one’s own performance to a discrepancy
between the expected and actual inputs. Our view
emphasizes how patients with AD, and patients with
amnesia in general [18], attribute a high value to their
sense of reliving as a result of their authentic ability to
experience the retrieved event rather than as a result of
their failures to experience it.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the authentic subjective
experience view is summarized as follows: when asked
to retrieve and report autobiographical memories,
patients with AD may struggle to describe them,
probably due to difficulties in both retrieving and
expressing their memories. However, these patients
may be able to enjoy an authentic subjective experience
of their memories (with corresponding emotions), as this
experience does not require linguistic processing. The
difficulty to describe specific autobiographical events in
AD is in agreement with the large body of research
demonstrating a diminished ability of the patients to
retrieve and report specific autobiographical memories
[19–32]. In this body of research, the patients are
typically asked to describe verbally the retrieved
memories. This verbal description may limit the patients’
ability to detail retrieved memories, which is supported
by a research demonstrating significant correlations
between autobiographical retrieval and verbal fluency
[33]. This suggestion can be also supported by the fact
that AD affects several aspects of language, typically
starting with semantics before proceeding to syntax and
phonology and eventually leads to frank aphasia, a
multimodal clinically significant disorder of under-
standing and producing language [34]. Moreover, these
linguistic difficulties may limit the ability of patients
with AD to describe memories and their subjective
experience. The authentic subjective experience view
can be supported by a research on normal aging,
demonstrating that narrative style can hinder the ability
of healthy older adults to retrieve specific memories
[35,36]. The authentic subjective experience view can
also be supported by a study demonstrating that
narrative abilities influence the ability of patients with
amnesia to describe pictures and imagined sce-
narios [37].
Several theoretical and clinical implications can be
drawn from the authentic subjective experience view. At
the theoretical level, this view contributes to the under-
standing of consciousness in patients with AD, espe-
cially to the understanding of how these patients relive
and have a sense of ownership of memories. The
authentic subjective experience view focuses on the
ability of the patients to travel back in time to re-
experience the past. The authentic subjective experience
view can be also considered as an attempt to demon-
strate how patients with AD can benefit from an
authentic subjective experience when retrieving per-
sonal memories.
Another theoretical implication of the authentic
subjective experience view is that it emphasizes the
heterogeneity of consciousness experience in AD.
Research on the subjective experience of memory in
AD has typically evaluated different forms of this
experience, such as sense of self [38], metamemory
[39], anosognosia [15], or even denial [40], suggesting a
heterogeneity of the consciousness experience in AD.
The authentic subjective experience view extends this
research by suggesting how, despite a compromise of







































Figure 1: The “authentic subjective experience” account.
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in AD (e.g., the subjective experience of autobiogra-
phical memory). It is noteworthy that this mixed picture
can also be observed for specific consciousness experi-
ences in AD. For instance, individual differences among
AD patients in anosognosia can be observed depending
on the assessment tool, the stage of dementia, and
the type of memory or other cognitive function in
question.
Regarding normal aging, the subjective experience
during autobiographical retrieval was evaluated by Piolino
et al. [41] who invited healthy older adults to retrieve recent
and remote autobiographical memories. After memory
retrieval, the participants had to provide a “Remember”
response, if they were able to recover a specific event with
its encoding context, and a “Know” response, if they just
knew this event had happened to them but could not
recall any contextual detail. Hence, Remember responses
referred to autonoetic consciousness, whereas Know
responses referred to noetic consciousness. The results
demonstrated increased Know responses with age for
recent but not for remote memories, supporting the view
that autonoetic consciousness is relatively better pre-
served in healthy older adults with respect to the distant
past than with respect to the more recent past. Note that,
using the Remember/Know paradigm, a research has
demonstrated increased Remember responses in patients
with AD [42,43], suggesting a decreased autonoetic
consciousness in AD. However, this research has been
concerned with memory for simple stimuli (e.g., words
and pictures) rather than with autobiographical memory.
One theoretical implication of the authentic sub-
jective experience view is its potential effect on the
patients’ sense of ownership of past experiences (i.e., the
feeling that these experiences belong to them). This
speculation can be compared with that of James [44]
who distinguished between the self as an agent (the I)
and the self as an object of reflection (the Me). According
to James [44], personal ownership, as dependent on the
“I”, is accompanied by a subjective experience imbued
with a sense of warmth and intimacy. This colorful
reliving can be associated with the subjective experience
of the past in patients with AD, an assumption supported
by our previous research demonstrating that these
patients attribute high personal importance to their
recall [16,17].
Altogether, the authentic subjective experience view
can be considered as the outcome of the interaction
between representational content (i.e., the retrieved
memory), conscious apprehension, and sense of owner-
ship resulting into the warmth and intimacy that
characterizes the subjective experience of the past.
3 Toward a positive view of the
consciousness experience in
patients
As illustrated in the previous section, one implication of the
authentic subjective experience view is that whereas some
aspects of the consciousness experience can be affected by
AD (e.g., anosognosia), other aspects (e.g., the ability to relive
autobiographical memories) can be fairly experienced by
patients with AD. At the clinical level, this implication is
important, as it emphasizes how patients with AD can
generate a subjective experience. Another implication is that
by enjoying a fair subjective experience of autobiographical
memories, patients with AD may be able to experience a rich
sense of self and identity unlike what is generally assumed.
This speculation can be supported by a research demon-
strating an intimate relationship between the autobiogra-
phical performance and the sense of self in AD [33,45].
The authentic subjective experience view is also an
attempt to alleviate the social stigma that can be associated
with the disease. Needless to say, AD is mainly associated
with dysfunction and poor cognitive abilities, and the social
stigma tends to depict the disease as the “death sentence”
and the patients as “empty shells” who experience a “death
of the mind” [46,47]. The authentic subjective experience
view can be considered as an alternative that identifies
probably partially spared components of consciousness (i.e.,
the subjective experience of past) in patients with AD. We
hope that this positive signal may prompt other researchers
and clinicians to investigate, or at least consider, remaining
intact cognitive functions in AD. We also hope that this view
contributes to care models that give positive meaning to the
consciousness experience of the patients and their ability to
introspect into their cognitive functioning and, consequently,
into their ability to judge, think, plan, and decide.
3.1 Perspectives: behavioral evaluation of
the authentic subjective experience
One major challenge for autobiographical retrieval in
AD, besides mnemonic difficulties, is aphasia. The
degree to which an authentic subjective experience
occurs may be partially beyond language-based descrip-
tion. Nevertheless, the validity of this view can be
subjected to rigorous research to delineate the beha-
vioral correlates of autobiographical memory in AD
using non-linguistic means. This future research may
be based on facial expression techniques. Due to
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advances in the technology allowing a reliable analysis
of facial expressions, there is a burgeoning interest in
facial expressions that can be activated during autobio-
graphical retrieval [48,49]. A study reported that emo-
tional memories trigger the corresponding basic facial
expressions (i.e., high happy facial expressions for
happy memories and sad facial expressions for sad
memories) [50]. Another study reported higher happy
emotional facial expressions during imagining the future
than during remembering the past [51]. It would be of
interest to evaluate whether emotional facial expressions
are triggered by retrieval of autobiographical memories
in AD, as such expressions would provide behavioral
evidence of the hypothesis that the patients subjectively
experience emotional characteristics of their past.
Any behavioral evidence of the hypothesis that the
patients possess authentic subjective experiences of
their past would be of valuable interest to understand
the subjective experience of the patients in the advanced
stages of AD. The study supporting the authentic
subjective experience hypothesis was conducted in
patients with mild AD [16,17]; therefore, research is
needed to investigate this experience in patients with
advanced AD. This issue is important because advanced
AD is characterized by severe language impairment and
apathy [52], limiting the ability of the patients to
describe memories and their subjective experience. We
believe that behavioral studies, such as those on facial
expressions, would provide valuable evidence of the
hypothesis that patients with advanced AD may possess
authentic subjective experiences of their past. Another
suggestion for future research would be to examine
neural basis of the authentic subjective experience
hypothesis. While there is a lack of research on this
hypothesis, a research has shown involvement of the
hippocampus in the decline of autobiographical memory
[53,54]. It would be of interest to investigate whether,
despite disruption of the hippocampus, the authentic
subjective experience can be supported by other brain
regions that are less affected by the disease, at least
during the early stages of the AD, such as the visual
cortices [55,56].
4 Summary
While research on the consciousness experience in AD
has been mainly concerned with the compromise of this
experience, the authentic subjective experience view
attempts to provide an alternative view according to
which patients with AD can enjoy, to some extent, an
authentic subjective experience during memory retrieval.
Although it is important to acknowledge that some
components of consciousness experience are affected by
AD (e.g., anosognosia), it is equally important to consider
whether patients can positively experience other compo-
nents such as emotion. By doing this, we hope that this
narrative review will contribute to a care model that
acknowledges and honors the patients’ subjective experi-
ences, provides positive meaning to them, and uses them
as a tool in managing the disease.
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